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reflected in three significant and interrelated ways that allow for investigation. First, a self-pattern is reflectively
reiterated in its narrative component. Second, studies of psychiatric or neurological disorders can help us
understand the precise nature of the dynamical relations in a self-pattern, and how they can fail. Third,
referencing predictive processing accounts, neuroscience can also help to explicate the dynamical relations
that constitute the self-pattern.
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The notion of a self-pattern, as developed in the pattern theory of self (Gallagher, 2013),
which holds that the self is best explained in terms of the kind of reality that pertains
to a dynamical pattern, acknowledges the importance of neural dynamics, but also
expands the account of self to extra-neural (embodied and enactive) dynamics. The
pattern theory of self, however, has been criticized for failing to explicate the dynamical
relations among elements of the self-pattern (e.g., Kyselo, 2014; Beni, 2016; de Haan
et al., 2017); as such, it seems to be nothing more than a mere list of elements.
We’ll argue that the dynamics of a self-pattern are reflected in three significant and
interrelated ways that allow for investigation. First, a self-pattern is reflectively reiterated
in its narrative component. Second, studies of psychiatric or neurological disorders can
help us understand the precise nature of the dynamical relations in a self-pattern, and
how they can fail. Third, referencing predictive processing accounts, neuroscience can
also help to explicate the dynamical relations that constitute the self-pattern.
Keywords: self, pattern, self-model, predictive processing, Free Energy Principle, psychopathology, narrative

INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the notion that a self is a mere phenomenal image produced by neural
representations, as proposed by Thomas Metzinger and others, we advance a pattern theory of
self as a positive account that has a number of distinct advantages. This account affirms that
selves are only ever apprehended as immersed in a meaningful world; it accommodates change
and adaptation to context; and at the same time it acknowledges a coherent organization as the
locus of experience and self-ascription. On this account, dynamical self-patterns1 involve and
are revealed in self-narratives, which track regenerative self-organizing processes and the various
disruptions of those processes in anomalous experience. Such patterns and disruptions are also
reflected in dynamical neural processes. Self, described in terms of such dynamical neural and
narrative processes, is not a fixed entity but is rather an ongoing production which brings a real but
contingent coherence to an evolving (or in some cases, devolving) stream of sensations, thoughts,
emotions, desires, memories, and anticipations.
Although Metzinger’s (2004) notion of a self-model indicates the relevance of brain processes
and their dynamical connections for an understanding of the concept of self, he also contentiously
1

The idea of dynamical patterns with fields of prediction and control in the domain of psychology are prefigured in earlier
research in theoretical biology (Rosen, 1970; Maturana and Varela, 1991) and cybernetics (McCulloch, 1965). Consistent with
earlier research such as this, we take “dynamical pattern” to involve a non-linear, adaptive, anticipatory, feedback system
comprising processes of interdependent elements which are determined not only by their properties and fields, but also by
their relationships and functions within the whole.
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proposes that “[n]obody ever was or had a self ” (p. 1). To be clear,
with this assertion Metzinger is rejecting accounts that explicitly
endorse or implicitly underwrite substantively “real” Cartesian
selves, i.e., dualistic conceptions of selves as grounded in separate
substances. We do not dispute this. There are, however, some
challenges that Metzinger’s account needs to address. First, if a
self is not real the way a substance is real, it is also the case
that the self is not non-real in the way an illusion is non-real
(Metzinger, 2004, p. 209). Accordingly, one needs to specify in
what way we may talk about the reality of the self.
Second, according to Metzinger, the phenomenal self is
generated in a process involving neuro-dynamics, from which
subjective self-awareness emerges. The key challenge for this
approach is to explain precisely how a self-model is related to
or generated in the brain. As we’ll show in section “Neural
Patterns and the Self,” there seems to be no agreement about
what brain processes are relevant to a self-representational
system, or whether there are specialized or exclusive self-specific
areas in the brain. Alternatively, one could appeal to predictive
processing models. Metzinger’s (2004) original proposal was
already sketching such a model (pp. 51–52). More recently
Metzinger has moved further in that direction (Metzinger, 2013,
2014; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017), endorsing the idea of an
automatic and continuing minimization of prediction error by
which the brain monitors the body and immediate environment
for potential unexpected events (citing, e.g., Friston, 2005;
Hohwy, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth, 2013).
An alternative way to think of a self-model is to consider
it as irreducible to brain processes, although brain processes
are not irrelevant to explaining self-model integration. Selfmodels, we will argue, additionally depend on a variety of
extra-neural factors, such as bodily processes and processes that
are social and cultural, and are generated in the organism’s
relations with its environment. This is the concept of a pattern
theory of self (Gallagher, 2013). On this view, the self has
the scientifically useful reality of a pattern (Dennett, 1991).
One challenge associated with this view is to demonstrate the
dynamical relations amongst elements that constitute a selfpattern. We wish to emphasize the point that while the brain
is not the sole generator of the self-pattern, mapping of selfrelated brain function may help to demonstrate the dynamical
and relatively coherent nature of self-patterns. Is it possible, in
this respect, that some version of the predictive processing model
might provide a means to clarify these dynamical relations?
In this paper, after reviewing some issues concerning self
and the brain, we’ll pursue the alternative concept of a pattern
theory of self. We’ll answer some objections that have been
raised concerning the dynamical relations amongst different
elements of a self-pattern. We’ll argue that there are three ways
to track the dynamical relations in a self-pattern: first, through
narrative; second, through the study of psychopathology; and
third, through predictive processing in the brain2 .

NEURAL PATTERNS AND THE SELF
A number of approaches have attempted to relate neural
processing to the concept of self. Karl Popper and John Eccles,
for example, defended a dualist view that treated the self as
an autonomous entity that interacted with neural processes,
and purportedly controlled them. “The self-conscious mind
acts upon . . . neural centres, modifying the dynamic spatiotemporal patterns of the neural events” (Popper and Eccles,
1977, p. 495; Eccles, 1989, 1994). This non-reductionist, Cartesian
view, however, did not represent either the philosophical or
neuroscientific consensus of the time, and still does not. It did
motivate a debate between the philosopher Mario Bunge, who
defended an emergentist view, and the neuroscientist Donald
MacKay, who, although starting “from our immediate experience
of what it is like to be a person” (MacKay, 1978, p. 601), staked
out a position between materialism and dualism (Bunge, 1977,
1979; MacKay, 1978, 1979, 1980). MacKay argued that since each
change in experience corresponds to a change in brain activity,
there is both first-person data and third-person data about the
conscious self. Importantly, for MacKay, despite the high degree
of correlation between these data sets, one set is not reducible to
the other set.
In these various discussions, the concept of self was never
clearly defined. Since the 1970s, however, there have been both
clarifications and complications introduced around the notion
of self as it is discussed in both philosophy and neuroscience,
and there have been important qualifications made regarding
correlations between brain and self. For example, LeDoux (2002,
p. 31) has pointed out that theories of the self “are not usually
framed in ways that are compatible with our understanding
of brain function.” This idea is echoed by Northoff et al.
(2006, p. 453): “Neither the historical nor modern psychological
approaches are obviously isomorphic with any known brain
analysis.” The lack of a perfect correlation between self and the
brain thus results in worries such as those expressed by Apps
and Tsakiris (2014, p. 85): “recent reviews of this literature have
concluded that the absence of a unifying theoretical framework
has resulted in a largely incoherent picture of the circuits and
mechanisms which are engaged during self-recognition.”
Such thoughts have not stopped the continuing analysis of
how various aspects of self relate to brain, however. Much of this
research asks how specific brain areas correlate with self-related
phenomena. Thus, for example, autobiographical knowledge,
personal beliefs, self-conceptions, and the recognition of our own
face have been grouped together as related to left hemisphere
activity (Turk et al., 2003; see also Kircher et al., 2000).
At the same time there is evidence that “processing of selfrelated information (e.g., autobiographical memory, self face
identification, theory of mind) is related to activity in the right
frontal cortex” (Platek et al., 2003, p. 147; see also Devinsky,
2000; Miller et al., 2001). Representations of both the physical
and phenomenological aspects of self, and “self-representation
in general” is said to involve the right lateral parietal cortex
(Lou et al., 2004, p. 6831), while the “self model . . . a theoretical
construct comprising essential features such as feelings of
continuity and unity, experience of agency, and body-centered

2

To be clear, we’ll use the term “self-model” to refer to Metzinger’s concept, as
shorthand for a set of self-related processes generated in the brain. In contrast,
we’ll use “self-pattern” to signify a pattern that constitutively includes both neural
and extra-neural factors and their dynamical relations.
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To achieve clarity in neuroscientific studies of self, it is
incumbent on researchers to define the precise aspect of self
under study. Selves are experiential, ecological, and agentive;
they are often engaged in reflective evaluations and judgments;
they are capable of various forms of self-recognition, selfrelated cognition, self-narrative, and self-specific perception
and movement. In many of these activities, selves are more
“in-the-world” than “in-the-brain,” and they are in-the-world
as-subject more so than as-object. (Vogeley and Gallagher,
2011, p. 129).

perspective” (Fossati et al., 2003, p. 1943) involves activation of
the medial prefrontal cortex in both hemispheres.
Cortical midline structures (CMS) have been shown to process
information related to self. In particular, activation of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) has been repeatedly
observed when subjects think about themselves (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) and when they make
judgments about their own personalities (Johnson et al., 2002;
Kelley et al., 2002; Heatherton et al., 2006; D’Argembeau et al.,
2007; Gutchess et al., 2007; Ruby et al., 2009). Lesion studies
also show that damage to the VMPFC leads to deficits in selfawareness (Stuss et al., 2001a,b). Northoff thus argues for a
unitary neural network or system responsible for all self-related
phenomena (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al.,
2006). The putative CMS self-system, however, covers a quite
large set of brain regions (including ventro- and dorsomedial
prefrontal, anterior and posterior cingulate, retrosplenial, and
medial parietal cortices). It involves a multitude of connections
between CMS and subcortical areas, and the possible role of
subcortical areas related to an embodied self (Northoff and
Panksepp, 2008).
The large number of cortical areas that correlate with selfreference or self-experience suggests that there is no specialized
brain area simpliciter responsible for generating “the self ”
(Gillihan and Farah, 2005). LeDoux (2002) notes the complexity:
“different components of the self reflect the operation of different
brain systems, which can be but are not always in sync” (p. 31).
It is also likely that no area of the brain is exclusively selfspecific (Legrand and Ruby, 2009). According to Craik et al.
(1999, p. 30), “every significant activation in the [self condition]
was also found in either the [other person condition] or the
[general semantic] condition, or both” (also Gillihan and Farah,
2005, p. 94). Moreover, most of the cited studies focus on selfreferential tasks, i.e., tasks that take the self or self-aspect to
be part of the object of consciousness – e.g., thinking about
myself, judging my personality traits, self-face identification. As
Legrand and Ruby (2009) make clear, this focus misses prereflective self-awareness, in which I am not aware of the self
as an object, but am self-aware in a non-observational way, as
the experiencing subject. The notion of ecological self-awareness
(Neisser, 1988) is an example of this kind of pre-reflective
self-awareness. The fact that I always perceive from a firstperson (egocentric) perspective suggests that there is always
a proprioceptive sense of this self-related perspective implicit
in my experience, sometimes called the sense of mineness or
the sense of ownership. Metzinger’s self-model also includes
elements related to first-person perspective and body schematic
processes that are associated with pre-reflective bodily processes
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Limanowski and Blankenburg,
2013).
Rather than finding a common, well-circumscribed brain area
of self-referential activation, then, these various studies indicate
a large number of diverse areas activated for a variety of selfrelated experience, but with no area ever activated exclusively for
self. This led Vogeley and Gallagher (2011) to conclude that the
self is both everywhere and nowhere in the brain, and to offer a
caution.
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In summary, explaining precisely how a self-model is related
to or generated by neuronal processes remains a key challenge
for any account of self. There is, as yet, no agreement about what
brain processes are relevant to a self-representational system, or
whether there are specialized or exclusive self-specific areas in the
brain.

A PATTERN THEORY OF SELF (PTS)
The pattern theory of self (PTS) attempts to capture both
the plurality of factors involved in self and the idea that
the self (as an agent) is more “in-the-world” than “in the
brain”3 . In brief, PTS argues that a self is constituted as a
pattern of a sufficient number of characteristic factors, including
embodied, experiential, affective, behavioral, intersubjective,
psychological/cognitive, reflective, narrative, extended, and
normative factors (see Table 1). Importantly, this is not intended
to be an additive list of factors, but a set of components
dynamically interrelated in a pattern or gestalt arrangement
(Gallagher, 2013). This means that an intervention that affects
one factor will involve modulations in the other factors.
Adjustments in one aspect, above a certain threshold, will lead
via dynamical interactions to changes in others. For example, very
basic aspects of self-experience, such as the sense of agency, can
be modulated by more complex, relational aspects, such as social
normative factors that involve culture, gender, race, health, etc.,
and by specific intersubjective factors that can either diminish
or enhance one’s autonomy and sense of agency (Young, 1980;
Gatens, 1996; Weiss, 1999; Murphy A., 2008; Gallagher, 2012;
Leach-Scully, 2012; Carel, 2016).
According to PTS, selves are individuated as patterns of
characteristic features, no one of which is sufficient for the
existence of a particular self. Specifications of which features
contribute to a self-pattern, and how they may be arranged
(e.g., whether some have primacy, or whether there might
be hierarchical arrangements among factors) are open to
contentious debate among philosophers and cognitive scientists
who defend opposing theories. Rather than deciding this issue a
priori, PTS treats it as an empirical question that may be answered
3

The phrase “in-the-world” is found in the phenomenological philosophy of
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. It signifies a structural characteristic of human
existence rather than a geographical location. Its meaning relates, in part, to
concepts such as “situation” in Dewey (1938), where the agent is not only
always situated, but the situation is always defined relative to the agent; Gibson’s
(1977) notion of “affordance”; or Koffka’s (2013) gestalt notion of “behavioral
environment.”

3
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TABLE 1 | Dynamical aspects of the self-pattern.
Elements of the pattern

Brief description

Embodied elements

Core biological, ecological and interoceptive factors, allowing the system to distinguish between itself and what is not
itself – extremely basic to all kinds of animal behavior.

Minimal experiential elements

First-person, pre-reflective, conscious experience, reflecting the self/non-self distinction, manifest in various
sensory-motor modalities (kinesthesia, proprioception, touch, vision, etc.) – including a sense of ownership (the
“mineness” of one’s experience) and a sense of agency for one’s actions (Rochat, 2011; Gallagher, 2012).

Affective aspects

Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging from bodily affects to what may be a typical affective or emotion pattern
(Newen et al., 2015).

Behavioral aspects

Behaviors and actions make us who we are – behavioral habits reflect, and perhaps actually constitute, our character.
This is a classic view that goes back at least to Aristotle.

Intersubjective interactions and capacities

Human are born with a capacity for attuning to inter-subjective existence, which develops into a social
self-consciousness – a self-for-others (Mead, 1913), manifested behaviorally in mirror self-recognition (Gallup et al.,
2011), and the neuronal mirror system (Gallese, 2014).

Psychological/cognitive elements

Traditional theories of the self focus on these factors, which may range from explicit self-consciousness to a conceptual
understanding of self as self, to personality traits of which one may not be self-conscious at all – psychological
continuity and the importance of memory are highlighted in the literature on personal identity (Shoemaker, 2011).

Reflective capacities

The ability to reflect on one’s experiences and actions – closely related to the notions of autonomy and moral
personhood, including the capacity to reflect and form second-order volitions about one’s desires (Frankfurt, 1982;
Taylor, 1989).

Narrative capacities

Although some theorists make the strong claim that narratives are constitutive for selves (Schechtman, 2007, 2011), for
PTS one can lose the ability to construct a self-narrative (as in cases of dysnarrativa) and still remain a self to the extent
that other elements of the pattern remain in place.

Extended/situated elements

Including the possibilities presented by physical pieces of property, and various things that we own (James, 1890).
Not only may we identify with our material belongings, the technologies we use, our professions, and the institutions we
work in, but we are dynamically related to the action possibilities they afford.

Normative factors

Ranging across possibilities presented by the kind of family structure and situation in which we grew up to cultural and
normative practices, involving physical and mental health, gender, race, and economic status, that define our way of
living.

cannot determine the nature of the dynamical links among the
various factors a priori, or simply by adopting a particular theory.
We read Kyselo’s proposal as suggesting that we need to look in
the direction of empirical examples, including cases of psychiatric
or neurological disorders, to sort out the precise nature of the
dynamical relations that would help us to understand how selves
can be integrated or disintegrated in particular cases. Rather than
an alternative to PTS, as Kyselo conceives it, however, working
out the dynamical relations would provide a more detailed
account of PTS.
From the perspective of PTS, it is not the case that one
needs to add something extra to the specific pattern dynamically
formed by the interrelations of the various elements in order
to be able to identify the coherency or structure or ordering
behind the diversity; rather the coherency, structure or ordering
will be reflected in the pattern that emerges from these
interrelations. Dynamical connections of the pattern themselves
get reflected in three significant and interrelated ways that allow
for investigation. First, a self-pattern is reflectively reiterated in its
narrative component. That is, self-narratives reiterate the other
components and the dynamical relations of a self-pattern in a
way that will allow us to make sense of these relations (see section
“What’s the Use of Narrative?”). Second, as already indicated, the
dynamics of a self-pattern are revealed in the way that they break
down in pathology. Empirical, clinical, and phenomenological
studies of psychiatric or neurological disorders can sort out
the precise nature of the dynamical relations in a self-pattern
(see section “Psychopathology”). Third, neuroscience can also

differently in different cases. It does not stipulate in advance what
features need to be present in each instance.
Although we emphasize the dynamical nature of the selfpattern, such that particular elements or factors are to be
considered dynamically interwoven with other elements, one
important criticism of PTS has been that there is so far no
explanation of these dynamical relations. Thus, for example,
Miriam Kyselo (2014) writes: “Once the diversity of self related
phenomena is acknowledged [as in PTS], we also need to
understand how the elements of a collection of relevant self
features interrelate. A pattern approach to the self acknowledges
diversity but lacks integration, offering no account of the
individual as explanatory whole” (p. 1; also see Beni, 2016).
Likewise, de Haan et al. (2017) suggest that the main weakness
of PTS is that “it is just a list; a heaping of aspects, without
an account of how they relate. There are no considerations on
their potential ordering, hierarchy or structure. But in the case of
psychiatric disorders and their treatment the relevant questions
precisely pertain to this structure, to the relation between aspects
of the self ” (pp. 5–6).
Both Kyselo and de Haan are concerned about how PTS
might explain various pathologies. As Kyselo rightly suggests,
researchers in cognitive science as they set up experiments, and
psychiatrists as they evaluate patients and attempt to understand
pathologies of the self, need to have a conception of the self as
an explanatory whole. PTS is nonetheless consistent with Kyselo’s
suggestion that an embodied-enactivist approach may be able to
offer an integrative perspective on the self as a whole. Yet we
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that takes over my narration. “The phenomenology of regret can
be described as a loss of control over our personal narrative, and
in this sense it is also a threat to our integrity. It is a threat to
the integrity of our autobiographical self-model, because, on the
personal level of description, we become aware of an irrevocable
damage to our life narrative” (Frith and Metzinger, 2016). The
emergence of an inner pain reflects the affective aspect of the
self-pattern. “Because it is an emotional and frequently also an
embodied experience, perhaps with heart wrenching qualities,
it is not something we can distance ourselves from – another
important way in which regret involves a loss of control” (Frith
and Metzinger, 2016).
The narrative is doing some work in tying together some of
the other factors in the self-pattern, and forming a “transtemporal
identity” of the subject across time. The relation between action
and regret, despite variations in my sense of agency, means that
I am the same person who acted in the past, and continues to be
responsible for my actions. Frith and Metzinger suggest that this
is a fictional unity: “a transtemporal, fictional ‘self ”’ constituted
by the narrative (Frith and Metzinger, 2016). Yet the action and
affective states – the pain and the regret – are real, and are factors
that specify my self-pattern.
We can also acknowledge how an intersubjective or social
dimension relates to both agency and affect, since, as the narrative
may reveal, others are affected (for example, frustrated) by my
actions. How I relate to those others partially shapes who I am.
In Frith and Metzinger’s (2016) terms, the “important point is
that, for any organism that has acquired the capacity to feel regret
and whose behaviour is determined by this very special form
of conscious content, the self-model and the group-model have
become functionally integrated in a much stronger way” (p. 204).
The narrative may in fact reflect my identification with the values
and desires of others, which may increase my emotional suffering
“from a self-caused frustration of group-preferences” (Frith and
Metzinger, 2016). I feel regret because, as one might say, my
conscience has been formed by my upbringing. As they put it,
the “group-model has invaded the organism’s self-model to such
a degree that the conflict between group and individual interests
is now internally modelled in a way that a) includes sanctions by
the group (regret is internal self-sanctioning), and b) the dynamic
competition between group and individual interests is now taking
place not only on the level of overt, bodily actions, but has
found a new platform – the self-model of the individual” (Frith
and Metzinger, 2016, pp. 204–205). That is, there are dynamical
adjustments in the self-pattern in which intersubjective/social
factors determine my reflective evaluation and my feelings about
what I have done. Most likely, these also manifest in my behavior
and get reflected again (and perhaps repetitively) in my narrative.
My regret and how I, and others, evaluate my past action can
have an effect on my future choice of action. My deliberations and
actions relate to normative factors, to “cultural practices, such
as moral codes and laws. By generating beliefs about self-control
[my narrative] shapes the sense of self and gives rise to concepts
like responsibility, intentionality, accountability, culpability, and
mitigating circumstances” (Frith and Metzinger, 2016, p. 205).
Frith and Metzinger are describing a loop through normative
factors that feeds back to influence the behavior of the person, and

help to explicate the dynamical relations that constitute the
self-pattern. In taking the notion of a self-pattern to be
the basis of a non-reductive approach to understanding self,
the intent is not to exclude neuroscience, or to downplay the
importance of brain function, which underpins many of the
bodily, experiential, and cognitive factors that make up a selfpattern. Indeed, as Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts (2017) suggest,
changes in neurophysiology can “index” changes in the selfpattern, complementary to the way that narrative reflects such
changes. In this respect, however, given the issues raised in
section “Neural Patterns and the Self,” it will be more productive
to look not at specific brain areas or neural representations to
find correlations but more generally at dynamical processing
and brain function. In section “Neuronal Patterns, Predictive
Processing and Self-Patterns,” we consider the development of
recent predictive processing models as a better approach to this
goal.

WHAT’S THE USE OF NARRATIVE?
One way to understand the narrative aspect of self is to take it
as a window that opens onto the self-pattern and offers a way to
map the dynamical relations among the various other factors of
the self. Self-narratives in some sense reflect, explicitly in content,
or implicitly in form, all of the other aspects of the self-pattern
(Hutto and Gallagher, 2017). Specifically, narrative is a means
of retrieving, disclosing, temporally mapping, and connecting all
the other aspects.
To show how this works, we’ll focus on one example that we
take from Frith and Metzinger (2016). They discuss the case of
regret, which, as they propose, involves a form of self-knowledge.
This kind of self-knowledge takes a narrative form in which I, as
the narrator, can give an account, and evaluate my past action.
Assuming that I have made the wrong choice sometime in the
past, I come to regret that choice, and this is something that
manifests itself in my self-narrative. What get reflected in my
narrative in this respect are changes or adjustments in a variety
of aspects of my self-pattern.
For example, the minimal experiential aspects of the selfpattern include the sense of agency and the sense of ownership.
Frith and Metzinger point out, first, that the situation captured
by the narrative involves a changing status of the sense of agency.
I had a sense of control over my actions when in fact I made
the wrong choice and acted on it. This sense of agency does not
apply to my regret, however, or at least I seem unable to avoid
my regret about that action. Adjustments in my sense of agency
are reflected in my narrative when I say to myself or to someone
else that I regret my action. In contrast, the sense of ownership
pertains to both my action and my regret: “while the sense of
agency is represented as something we possessed in the past, the
state of regret itself does not itself involve a sense of agency. While
the phenomenology of ownership is crisp and distinct (I identify
with my regret, it is an integral part of myself), regret itself is not
an action. It is a kind of inner pain that simply appears in us”
(Frith and Metzinger, 2016, p. 202). As they also make clear, my
regret is not just a characteristic that I can narrate, it is something
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We can learn about pathological changes or transformations of
self-patterns from what the patient reports, i.e., from her own
self-narrative. For example, she may report (or her reports may
reflect) the loss of a sense of agency, as in some schizophrenic
symptoms, or in addiction, without losing other basic experiential
elements that are part of a self-pattern. These are not uniform
reports across different disorders. In the case of schizophrenic
thought insertion, for example, the experience is of some other,
external agent invading one’s stream of thought. In the case of
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), the patient knows that
she makes herself do what she does, but nonetheless cannot
resist. In drug addiction, there are instances where there is a
conflict between first-order desires and second-order, reflective
intentions, where the drug wins out in opposition to what the
subject really wants. In some episodes of bulimia the agent is
in prospective control as she plans out and executes the binge,
perhaps loses control in the middle of it, and then retrospectively
feels that she was completely out of control (see Kendler, 2008
for these examples). Differences in how the sense of agency
works in these different disorders impinge differently on affective
aspects of the self-pattern. Addiction and bulimia may involve
positive hedonic experiences at first; but this is not the case in
OCD where the subject experiences no pleasure in what she is
doing, and is motivated by a type of dissatisfaction or sense of
incompleteness.
In other disorders, patients may exhibit loss of certain
psychological and cognitive abilities, such as the ability to recall
earlier events (as in amnesia or Alzheimer’s Disease). They, or
their caregivers, may report these changes; or these changes
may start to dramatically shape the patients’ narratives. Along
with this, they may have undergone character or personality
changes. In many cases, pathological changes can interfere with
the individual’s autonomy and positive social engagement. In
other cases, some degree of self-identity and autonomy may
continue to be supported by intersubjective relations and/or
extended aspects in the subject’s surroundings. In the case of
depression, the patient may reveal thinking that reflects disorders
in mood and affective processing as well as disrupted processes
connected to the sense of agency and identity. Depressed patients
can experience self-alterations and identity changes, and they
will attempt to integrate these changes into their life by trying
to understand the reasons they’re feeling this way. They may
report feelings of helplessness, desperation, self-loathing, as well
as the incapacity to work, to act, to think clearly (Solomon, 2001;
O’Brien, 2004).
Mapping the changes across different aspects of self-pattern
should reveal a set of underlying dynamics that get disrupted or
adjusted as one change impinges on the whole pattern. That is, if
the pattern is in fact a dynamical gestalt, then we should expect
to find not just isolated symptoms affecting one aspect alone,
but readjustments (disruptions or compensatory adjustments)
in some set of other aspects. One tends to see this in light of
multiple factor theories of different disorders. If, for example, in
schizophrenia, one’s minimal experience of the sense of agency is
disrupted (due to some neurological malfunction), this can lead
to cognitive-based delusions, which in turn can impinge on affect
and social relations, as well as changes in the structure of the

they suggest that “the sense of agency and the idea of voluntary
action are acquired through cultural learning. The causal link
between the group level and the individual level is constituted
by the conscious self-model, in which group preferences are
increasingly reflected as social complexity increases” (Frith and
Metzinger, 2016, p. 205). Alternatively, as they point out, further
physical and affective changes may lead to anxiety and depression
(Roese et al., 2009), delayed sleep onset and insomnia (Schmidt
and Van der Linden, 2013), and onward to additional changes in
self-narrative. As adjustments occur in the self-pattern, they get
reflected in the self-narrative.
The point is that we can move forward on understanding the
dynamical relations (between experiential, embodied, affective,
social and normative factors) that constitute a coherent selfpattern as they get reflected in self-narrative. We can map out
these relations by looking at instances where some action, event,
or intervention causes changes in various factors in the selfpattern that get traced out in self-narrative, including those
instances where the pattern becomes disordered, or ordered
differently4 .

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
If we avoid doctrinaire approaches to psychiatric classifications
that insist on exclusive taxonomies of either natural kinds or
social constructs, and opt instead for what Zachar (2003) calls
“practical kinds,” it may be useful to consider the idea that all
psychiatric disorders are disorders of self (Daly and Gallagher,
unpublished). Psychiatric disorders tend to be multifactorial.
To the extent that we think of such disorders as self-disorders,
each individual case of a particular disorder may show different
patterns of dynamical relations among the various factors that
constitute a particular self. This is because different factors may
involve different weights in different individuals. For example,
anorexia will present differently in a disciplined person with
high degrees of self-control than in an impulsive individual
(Zachar, 2008, p. 334). Variations in the amount of social support
or different cultural contexts may determine how a disorder
develops. But we can expect to see typical patterns of practical
kinds associated with different disorders. Schizophrenia, for
example, may affect multiple aspects of experience, cognition,
mood, and agency in certain typical ways, while panic disorder
will be more aspect limited in its impact (Murphy D.P., 2008).
The list of elements or contributories to the self-pattern, and
the dynamical relations among them can be used to specify
most if not all aspects relevant to symptomology in psychiatric
cases. Seeing how such aspects of the pattern undergo typical
changes, comparatively in different disorders, can help to reveal
the particular dynamical relations among those aspects. Here
again, looking specifically at the narrative aspect can help.
4

In Daly and Gallagher (unpublished; also see Hutto and Gallagher, 2017) we
argue that in the therapeutic context, narratives not only help us to understand
patients’ experiences, but can also operate as a therapeutic tool that allows them to
incorporate any new awareness or life adjustments into a continuing narrative. We
can formalize the use of narrative in therapeutic contexts – not just in the sense of
using a narrative therapy, but also in conjunction with other therapies.
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• Affective aspects may include (a) depressed mood (sadness,
emptiness, hopelessness), diminished interest, feelings of
worthlessness or guilt; (b) loss of empathic resonance
with others, loneliness, self-loathing or low self-esteem,
pervasive sense of dread, unaccountable fears, feeling
that one’s experience is absolutely private and absolutely
isolating, despair, feeling of being excluded, not understood,
underappreciated, self-alienation.
• Behavioral aspects may include (a) psychomotor agitation
or retardation (observable by others); (b) inability to stop
crying, diminished physical self-care, self-harm to reduce
anxiety.
• Intersubjective aspects may involve (a) . . . (b) feeling like a
burden for others, like a loser, feeling excluded – feeling of
not belonging, profound intersubjective alienation, concern
that others think they are malingerers, negative assessment
of self-appearance (in mirror), feeling invisible.
• Psychological/cognitive aspects may include (a) diminished
ability to think or concentrate, indecisiveness, recurrent
thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal ideation without
a specific plan, or formulation of a specific plan for
suicide; (b) disordered attention, excessive rumination,
toxic thought processes, mind fog, nihilism, difficulty in
imagining a different future, changed time perception, time
experienced as passing very slowly, closure of the future.
• Narrative aspects may include (a) . . . (b) repeatedly rescripting conversations that were deemed unsatisfactory,
predominance of use of first person pronouns, past
narratives are couched in terms of loss, failure, and damage,
present narratives hold little or no interest, future narratives
have dried up.
• Extended/situated aspects may include (a) . . . (b) things
and surroundings experienced as less salient; diminished
engagement with the world; loss of sense of belonging or
fitting in place.

patient’s narratives and self-concept (Gallagher, 2000, 2003; Frith
and Gallagher, 2002; Berna et al., 2016).
In the case of psychopathology, self-narratives can provide a
forensic measure, a linguistic fingerprint, of different conditions
(Gallagher and Cole, 2011). Studies of the narratives of people
with psychopathology show different sets of dynamical relations
among aspects of self-pattern. Junghaenel et al. (2008) found a
lower frequency of cognitive words (e.g., cause, know, ought)
in the narratives of psychiatric patients in general, signaling
some kind of cognitive change. In various depression narratives,
alterations in what Ratcliffe (2014) calls existential feelings
can be mapped out across different components of the selfpattern, including bodily and experiential changes (Fuchs, 2005;
Slaby and Stephan, 2008; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009; Paskaleva,
2011). Narrative structures themselves, including temporal and
syntactical structures, are disrupted in depression. Pennebaker
et al. (2003) show that increased use of the first-person
pronoun in self-narratives predicts both depression and mania.
Stirman and Pennebaker (2001), in a study of artists who
committed suicide compared to those who did not, found
relatively higher frequencies of self-reference words (e.g., I, me,
my) as compared to other-reference words (e.g., we, them,
they). Likewise, in schizophrenia self-narratives can reflect the
disruption of the dynamics of the self-pattern (Bovet and Parnas,
1993; Gallagher, 2003; Phillips, 2003). Gruber and Kring (2008)
showed that for schizophrenics, negative emotion narratives
were less grammatically clear than positive ones, and positive
emotion narratives were more likely to involve other people than
negative narratives. It’s also the case that schizophrenic patients
who narrate emotionally loaded facts (vs. neutral facts) showed
higher degree of dyslogia or wrong or novel words (Caixeta
et al., 1999). In schizophrenia, self-narratives are less coherent
and elaborate than controls, suggesting problems connecting
self and memory (Raffard et al., 2010; Berna et al., 2016).
Lysaker et al. (2002, 2005) looking at narrative, metacognition,
and self-esteem, developed a helpful tool, the Scale to Assess
Narrative Development (STAND), which can capture some of
these changes.
In the case of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), almost all
factors in the self-pattern may be affected. The following list is
based on Daly and Gallagher (unpublished). Those aspects listed
under (a) are derived from the DSM-V list of symptoms. Those
listed under (b) are from a variety of interviews, vignettes, and
patient narratives collated from various sources5 .

To define the dynamical connections among these various
changes one might have to track the etiology and temporal
development of specific symptoms and/or recovery during
treatment. We can expect that in recovery, some symptoms may
respond quickly while others lag behind or may require different
treatments.

NEURONAL PATTERNS, PREDICTIVE
PROCESSING, AND SELF-PATTERNS

• In regard to embodied elements, the subject may undergo (a)
significant changes in weight, insomnia or hypersomnia; (b)
lack of appetite, slowness of movement.
• Experiential aspects may involve (a) fatigue or loss of
energy; (b) feelings of heaviness, feeling disembodied or
hyperembodied, feeling like an automaton (reduced sense
of agency).

Studies of depression suggest that in the depressed subject,
abnormal dynamical synchronies exist between the various
factors of first-person perspective, bodily/emotional agency, and
reflective (narrative related) agency, as measured by dynamical
connections across correlated brain areas (Fingelkurts and
Fingelkurts, 2017). Patients with MDD “have abnormal selfrelated processing, mostly expressed as increased self-focus,
excessive self-reflection (rumination) and association of the self
with negative emotions. . .. Generally, excessive ruminative selffocus produces such feelings as worry, guilt, shame, jealousy,

5

Styron, 1990; Manning, 1994; Wurtzel, 1995; Foster Wallace, 1998; Wolpert, 1999;
Solomon, 2001; Stirman and Pennebaker, 2001; Belle Doucet, 2003; O’Brien, 2004;
Broome, 2005; Fuchs, 2005; Barton et al., 2008; Westerbeck and Mutsaers, 2008;
Radden, 2009; Stein, 2012; Flint and Kendler, 2014; Opel et al., 2014; Ratcliffe, 2014;
Trigg, 2016; Kelly, 2017a,b; Kirk et al., 2017; Stanghellini, 2017.
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which may lead to insomnia . . . increased anxiety. . .. Patients
with depression showed a higher degree of interoceptive
awareness [. . . and] distorted body self-image. . ..” (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, 2017, p. 30). As these researchers suggest, such
aspects of selfhood “are not entities that simply modify something
that has its own independent existence, but rather together form a
dynamic pattern, that as a whole constitutes a complex selfhood”
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2017, p. 35). The hypothesis that
the dynamical relations among these aspects may be reflected in
dynamical neural connections offers another way to make such
relations open to investigation6 .
This hypothesis is defended within the framework of
predictive processing and the free energy principle (FEP) in
several recent papers7 . Limanowski and Blankenburg (2013),
for example, argue that the minimal (pre-reflective) experiential
aspects of the bodily self, including the first-person perspective,
and the senses of agency and ownership or mineness, all of which
depend on multisensory integration, including interoception,
can be “mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished
by the FEP and may constitute the basis for higher-level,
cognitive forms of self-referral” (p. 1; also see Fotopoulou, 2012).
Beyond minimal experiential aspects of the self, multisensory
integration on the predictive processing model can also explicate
connections to affective factors (Seth, 2013), and solve problems
pertaining to self-recognition, which may involve recognition
of the self-as-object, as in, for example, mirror self-recognition
(Apps and Tsakiris, 2014). As Apps and Tsakiris point out, this
approach can explain how self-specific neural processing may
arise in any multisensory processing, without positing specialized
circuits or parts of the brain that are self-specific (important for
avoiding the problems outlined in section “Neural Patterns and
the Self ”). Indeed, predictive processing accounts suggest that
although self-recognition may involve the specific congruency of
predictions driven by efference processes and incoming sensory
input (e.g., Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2000; Friston et al., 2010;
Brown et al., 2013), the FEP framework “provides flexibility, with
fewer constraints on what types of information can drive selfrecognition” (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014, p. 89). In this respect, the
claim is that predictive models provide the resources to explain
all of the various factors that contribute to the self-pattern. As
Apps and Tsakiris (2014) note, “This is particularly important,
given the evidence to suggest that the continuity of the self may
be underpinned by many different types of information, the
integration of which leads to a coherent sense of one’s body”
(p. 908 ).

Predictive models conceive of a system such as the brain
or the organism as perceiving or coping with the world by
predicting what it will encounter, and then minimizing prediction
errors generated in processing sensory input. The uncertainty of
experience is measured in terms of the quantity of prediction
errors (free energy) in the system. The system reduces free
energy by revising its predictions or by taking action to change
its environment to match its predictions, or both. Although
internalist descriptions of predictive processing conceive of
the brain as hypothesizing (or becoming) a “hierarchical
generative model” of the world (Hohwy, 2013), other descriptions
emphasize active, embodied engagement (“active inference”) with
the aim of maintaining an organism-environment attunement
(Bruineberg et al., 2016; Gallagher and Allen, 2016; Clark, 2017;
also see Hohwy and Michael, 2017 on this point).
The minimal experiential elements of the self-pattern are
based on a model that “successfully predict[s] or match[es] the
sensory consequences of our own movement, our intentions in
action, and our sensory input” (Limanowski and Blankenburg,
2013, p. 3; citing Hohwy, 2007, p. 9). “In short, the notion
that there is a ‘self ’ is the most parsimonious and accurate
explanation for sensory inputs. In mathematical terms, this
parsimonious accuracy is exactly the quantity that is optimised
when minimising free energy or prediction error” (Apps and
Tsakiris, 2014, p. 89; Hohwy and Michael, 2017).
The embodied system predicts and integrates both
exteroceptive and interoceptive multisensory variations in a
probabilistic way as we perceive and move and experience
ourselves moving. The integrated sensory experience is not about
the self (in the sense of taking the self as an intentional object); it’s
about the world and at the same time (in an ecological fashion)
it registers bodily states and self-movement. This cross-modal,
self-correcting interoceptive, proprioceptive, efferent/afferent
and exteroceptive integration generates a self-model (Metzinger,
2004), manifested phenomenologically in a body-centered spatial
frame of reference.
Following this logic, higher-level multisensory areas must
predict input in multiple sensory modalities, which according
to Apps and Tsakiris (2014) implies “a high level representation
[or model] (of self) that elaborates descending predictions to
multiple unimodal systems” (Limanowski and Blankenburg,
2013, p. 3)9 .
dynamically constituted self-pattern is not woven around a central self that has
its own independent existence.” This implies that one acknowledges the diversity
of elements that enter into the self-pattern, and at the same time allow for the
possibility that in any single organism there may be some degree of integration
reflected at the level of neurobiology.
9
We take this basic idea of the FEP (if not the precise vocabulary used to describe
it) to be consistent with enactivist approaches to cognition and the notion of
system autonomy. “An autonomous system produces and sustains its own identity
[. . .] and thereby establishes a perspective from which interactions with the world
acquire a normative status” (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009, p. 25). Here one could
say much more about the relation between the FEP and the concept of autopoiesis
(and its associated concept of autonomy) as found in enactivist accounts (see
Bruineberg et al., 2016; Gallagher and Allen, 2016; Bitbol and Gallagher, 2018).
Enactivists discount notions of hierarchical processing, and distinctions between
top-down and bottom-up, or internal versus external, in favor of more gestaltlike relations (Gallagher, 2017). These are not issues we pursue here. The point we
wish to make here is limited to the idea that predictive processing in general, i.e.,

6

As one reviewer noted, for a full account of the relations that exist between
neuronal processes and aspects of the self-pattern one would have to consider the
different timescales involved and their non-linear dynamical relations. This is not
something we can discuss here, but see Varela (1999) and Gallagher (2017).
7
The FEP aims to offer a unified brain theory that can account for the diverse
empirical data related to action, perception, and learning. As Friston (2010)
writes: “The FEP says that any self-organizing system that is at equilibrium with
its environment must minimize its free energy. The principle is essentially a
mathematical formulation of how adaptive systems (that is, biological agents like
animals and brains) resist a natural tendency to disorder” (p. 127).
8
This may be one way to address a worry raised by Beni (2016, p. 3731),
namely that it can be particularly difficult to account for the relation of the very
different kinds of aspects of the self-pattern, across different dimensions, since “the
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as part of the self-model (or according to PTS, the embodied
factors of the self-pattern), give rise to “emotional feeling states.”
Limanowski and Blankenburg (2013) provide further analysis
from this perspective to explain how the sense of agency and
sense of mineness emerge as part of the experiential aspect
of the self-pattern, and how predictive processing also helps
to explicate intersubjective self–other relations. Here, then, we
see ways to connect embodied, minimal experiential, affective,
and intersubjective aspects of the self-pattern. The point we
want to highlight here is that predictive processing approaches
to understanding the function of the system (the brain in
its relation to body and environment) potentially allow for
the mapping of dynamical relations among the embodied,
experiential and affective, and intersubjective elements of the
self-pattern in a way that is reflected in neural processes.
Predictive processing suggests that these dynamical relations are
hierarchically arranged, and this would be one way (although
not the only way) to see that this explanation may also show
how the very basic (embodied, experiential and affective) aspects
of the self-pattern relate to more complex (cognitive, reflective,
intersubjective and narrative) aspects.
Predictive processing accounts also suggest explanations of
the failures of self-related experience found in psychopathologies.
Seth (2013), for example, reviews research on deficits in
predictive processing in psychiatric disorders affecting selfrepresentation. Comparator models of disturbances in selfhood,
for example, in schizophrenic delusions of control (Frith,
1992, 2011; Gallagher, 2000, 2004), foreshadow such predictive
models of explanation. On predictive models, delusions may
arise from the dominance of top-down predictions suppressing
anomalous exteroceptive prediction errors (Fletcher and Frith,
2009). “This view has been finessed in terms of abnormal
encoding of the relative precision of priors and sensory evidence
to account for a broad range of psychotic symptoms” (Seth, 2013,
p. 571). Seth thus proposes predictive processing explanations
(especially involving interoceptive processing related to selfhood)
for alexithymia (deficits in emotional awareness), psychosis
and anxiety, disorders of body image and body ownership,
depersonalization, and derealization.

As Apps and Tsakiris (2014) and Limanowski and
Blankenburg (2013) agree, this self-model is plastic so that
basic factors such as the experience of self-location (location
of one’s body) and the sense of ownership can be manipulated
through experimental variances in stimulation such as in
the rubber hand illusion (RHI) or whole-body displacement
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke,
2012). These minimal experiential aspects of the self-pattern
result from the self-specifying integration of bottom-up input
(e.g., the combination of visual and tactile input in the case
of the RHI) and top-down factors or priors (e.g., the habitual
predictions associated with body image), which drives the
illusion of ownership of the rubber body part. The illusory model
(which generates the experience of the felt and the observed
touch as at the same location) “is selected [by the brain] because
it more successfully explains the incoming prediction error in
favor of a unified self ” (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013;
see Hohwy, 2013). This model minimizes prediction error
(free energy); it can be further refined toward a more veridical
model by active inference, i.e., by moving my hand. Getting a
veridical model of my body and its relation to the environment,
or something close to a veridical model (reducing free energy in
the system), is important for survival; the self exists “iff (sic) [sic]
I am a veridical model of my environment” (Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013, p. 4; quoting Friston, 2011).
This last thought, that the organism (the bodily self), rather
than “having” a model, is itself the model of the environment
is, as we understand it, Friston’s way of emphasizing the strong
connectivity between organism and environment – who we are,
even in a very basic embodied way, is shaped by the environment,
our interactions with, and our actions in the environment.
In terms of the PTS, this suggests a dynamical integration
between the embodied and experiential aspects of the selfpattern and the extended and normative aspects (understanding
the environment to be social/cultural as well as physical)10 .
Evidence for the close connection (which could be modeled as a
dynamical causal reciprocity) between embodied (interoceptive)
factors and experiential aspects can also be found in (1) the fact
that during the rubber hand illusion the temperature of one’s
real hand drops as the sense of ownership shifts to the rubber
hand (Moseley et al., 2008). This is “interpreted as evidence for
top-down regulations of autonomic control and interoceptive
prediction error minimization during the RHI” (Limanowski
and Blankenburg, 2013, p. 4); and (2) the idea that selfawareness emerges “from interaction of interoceptive predictions
and prediction errors” (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013, p. 5,
citing Critchley and Seth, 2012). Furthermore, Seth (2013); Seth
et al. (2011), and Suzuki et al. (2013) suggest that interoceptive
(e.g., autonomic) and efferent or motor control signals, operating

CONCLUSION
In response to skepticism about how the elements of a selfpattern are dynamically related to each other, such that they
constitute a relatively coherent, if not strictly unified pattern,
we have suggested three ways in which we can discover or
investigate such dynamical relations. First, we suggested that a
self-pattern is reflectively reiterated in its narrative component.
Various components and dynamical relations of the self-pattern
are reflected in self-narratives in a way that help us make
sense of these relations. Second, they are revealed in the
way that they break down in pathologies. The empirical and
clinical exploration of psychiatric or neurological disorders
can contribute to an understanding of the precise nature of
the dynamical relations in a self-pattern. Third, as outlined
in the previous section, predictive processing approaches to

disregarding important differences between internalist and enactivist conceptions
of it, can provide a sense of how neuronal processing reflects dynamical relations
in the self-pattern.
10
Apps and Tsakiris (2014, p. 91) note the influence of culturally shaped priors
on predictive processing. “There is also evidence of more long-term contextual
influences on self-recognition related priors, highlighted by the role that cultural
and societal effects have on self-other decision-making. For instance, self-other face
recognition has been shown to be different across cultures. . ..”
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neuroscience can help explicate the dynamical relations that
constitute the self-pattern as they are reflected in processes that
bridge brain, body, and environment.
It should be clear from reviewing some of the evidence
in support of these suggestions that explicating the dynamical
relations that constitute a self-pattern is a complex task that
requires an interdisciplinary approach. Neuroscientific predictive
processing accounts constantly make reference to organism and
environment, and can be enhanced by explications of embodied
cognition, phenomenology, and psychopathology. Studies of
psychopathology are enlightened not only by neuroscience, but
also by clinical work and the analysis of patients’ self-narratives.
The analysis of such narratives can deepen our understanding
of the dynamical relations amongst different first- and secondperson aspects of the self-pattern and reveal the complexities of
human existence.
In this respect the phenomenological approach taken by de
Haan et al. (2015), which integrates neuroscientific, pathological
studies, and self-narrative (based on phenomenological
interviews) is a good example of the kind of work that needs
to be done to further the explication of a pattern theory of self
and our understanding of the dynamics of the self-pattern. Their
study of the experiences of OCD patients who have undergone
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) treatment shows changes (1) in
affordance structure (in terms of a patient’s pragmatic relations
with world and others), (2) in affect (moods and feelings), and (3)
in reflective, second-order evaluations about their interactions

and themselves. They rightly argue that these neurological
effects are “global and thorough” indicating “a pattern among
these experiences . . . [where] all of these elements seem to
play a role” (de Haan et al., 2013, p. 6). Admittedly, trying to
explicate the holistic character of these kinds of experiences
is, as they suggest, “tricky business”; nonetheless, the “focus
on dynamics” is the way to start mapping out how various
factors in a self-pattern relate to one another. Accordingly, it
is only through such empirical, clinical, and phenomenological
studies that we will be able to sort out how the dynamics
of the self-pattern work, and how they may be different in
pathological cases or become readjusted in cases of clinical
treatments.
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